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Abstract
Extensible systems allow services to be configured and
deployed for the specific needs of individual applications.
This paper describes a safe and efficient method for user-
level extensibility that requires only minimal changes to the
kernel. A sandboxing technique is described that supports
multiple logical protection domains within the same address
space at user-level. This approach allows applications to
register sandboxed code with the system, that may be exe-
cuted in the context of any process. Our approach differs
from other implementations that require special hardware
support, such as segmentation or tagged translation look-
aside buffers (TLBs), to either implement multiple protec-
tion domains in a single address space, or to support fast
switching between address spaces. Likewise, we do not
require the entire system to be written in a type -safe lan-
guage, to provide fine-grained protection domains. Instead,
our user-level sandboxing technique requires only paged-
based virtual memory support, and the requirement that ex-
tension code is written either in a type-safe language, or by
a trusted source.
Using a fast method of upcalls, we show how our sand-
boxing technique for implementing logical protection do-
mains provides significant performance improvements over
traditional methods of invoking user-level services. Experi-
mental results show our approach to be an efficient method
for extensibility, with inter-protection domain communica-
tion costs close to those of hardware-based solutions lever-
aging segmentation.
1. Introduction
Fundamental to the design of any general purpose op-
erating system is the need to provide trusted services to
applications. These services are responsible for the pre-
dictable and safe management of hardware resources and
abstractions. However, the services typically implemented
by general purpose systems are often ill-suited to the spe-
cific needs of many applications. For example, a real-
time application is not well served by a scheduling policy
that does not consider the timely and predictable execu-
tion of processes. Similarly, a web server [24] may bene-
fit from its own buffer cache algorithm that over-rides the
default caching and paging policy [3]. This has motivated
researchers to study various system designs that support ex-
tensibility [32, 16, 2, 31, 6, 8, 14], thereby allowing services
to be tailored to the requirements of the applications they
support [4, 15].
While extensible systems have desirable properties, they
have posed at least three conflicting challenges: (1) how
to guarantee efficient execution of the extension code that
modifies or adds functionality to the system, (2) how to en-
sure the safety of extensions that could otherwise violate
the integrity of the system, or applications themselves, and
(3) how to provide support for extensibility without signif-
icant modification to the standard interfaces offered by the
system. One approach that is arguably most efficient is to
allow extensions to be linked into the address space of the
operating system kernel, thereby allowing them to be in-
voked by direct function calls within the kernel protection
domain, or via system calls from user-space. The downside
is that application-specific code is placed in a trusted ad-
dress space that may jeopardize system correctness and/or
violate security guarantees.
Various approaches have been proposed to guarantee the
safety of kernel service extensions [36]. These approaches
rely on techniques such as type-safe languages [2, 27, 28,
9, 22], sandboxing [30, 31], proof-carrying codes [29],
or hardware-support [6, 26]. Notwithstanding, many re-
searchers have argued that kernel extensions are inappropri-
ate for a number of reasons, beyond the sophisticated tech-
niques necessary to enforce safety. One argument against
extensible kernels is that an extension interface must be
provided, in addition to a standard API, that affects com-
patibility, interoperability, and evolution of OS implemen-
tations [10]. Similarly, supporters of micro-kernels [13, 26,
20] argue that only a core set of base abstractions should
be part of a kernel, while more complex abstractions and
(extensible) services should be implemented in user-space.
This approach provides a clear separation of concerns and,
hence, ease of addition and modification of services without
affecting the kernel.
Unfortunately, there are costs associated with the imple-
mentation of extensible services at user-level. Overheads
are typically incurred as a result of communication via the
trusted kernel, as well as scheduling and switching between
address spaces that isolate services. In fact these overheads,
associated with the communication between user-level ser-
vices in separate address spaces, have caused major prob-
lems for the efficient design of micro-kernels. This has
led to the consensus that micro-kernels are inherently non-
portable if they are to be implemented efficiently, implying
that special hardware support is necessary [26].
Regardless of whether or not service extensions are im-
plemented in the kernel or at user-level, they need to be
isolated in logical protection domains that cannot adversely
affect the behavior of the system, or applications. That is,
the range of memory addresses accessible to application-
specific service extensions must be restricted. While fea-
tures such as segmented memory can be used to provide
logical protection domains within a single address space,
such hardware support is not common on all processors
(except a few such as the Intel x86 [21]). However, most
hardware platforms for general purpose systems do sup-
port page-based virtual memory, that requires each protec-
tion domain to exist in its own address space, mapped to
a range of physical addresses using private page tables. It
is on these platforms, that there are costs associated with
switching and communicating between logical protection
domains, since the processing context has to be changed
each time we switch to a new address space.
In summary, it is desirable to allow the services of a sys-
tem to be customized for the specific needs of applications.
Supporting user-level extensibility has the benefit that ker-
nel interfaces remain largely unchanged, and there is a clear
division between extension and kernel code. However, pro-
viding a safe and efficient mechanism for user-level extensi-
bility is still a challenge, especially on commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) systems that primarily support protection at
the granularity of page-based address spaces.
1.1. Motivation and Contributions
This paper is motivated by the desire to implement exten-
sible services at user-level in a manner that is safe, efficient,
and requires minimal changes to the underlying kernel. We
show how it is possible to achieve these goals using a user-
level sandboxing technique, that enables COTS systems to
be extended for the specific needs of applications. In fact,
our approach places no specific requirements on the under-
lying OS structure. As a consequence, it is possible for our
technique to implement micro-kernel services, interposition
agents [23, 17], virtual machines [18, 33] and entire OSes in
a sandboxed region above a kernel that is, say, monolithic.
Our approach differs from other solutions in that it nei-
ther relies exclusively on hardware (e.g., Palladium [6]) nor
software (e.g., software fault isolation [30], or Java) sup-
port. Instead, we combine both hardware and software fea-
tures to implement logical protection domains within page-
based address spaces that may be accessed efficiently via
a trusted kernel. We show how this technique can be used
to safely implement application and system service exten-
sions, in a manner similar to the way new services and ex-
tensions are implemented in micro-kernels, extensible, and
library-based systems [12]. Our technique allows applica-
tion and system developers to map service extensions into
a sandboxed memory region shared by all process address
spaces running in the system. The sandboxed region lever-
ages page-based hardware protection while extension code
itself is either written by a trusted source, or in a type-safe
language.
By supporting service extensions at user-level, there are
several advantages. Most notably:
• it is possible for such code to leverage libraries that
would be unavailable within the kernel,
• there is no need for custom interfaces as extensions can
instead leverage existing system call interfaces,
• it is possible to rapidly prototype code that would oth-
erwise cause system failure, and
• extensions can be developed in a manner similar to reg-
ular application code without awareness of kernel in-
ternals.
We show, with minimal modifications to an existing op-
erating system (specifically, a monolithic x86-based Linux
system), the efficient implementation of logical protection
domains at user-level that have the performance benefits of
approaches requiring special hardware support. Using the
proposed techniques, we show how to efficiently extend the
behavior of an existing system at user-level without the tra-
ditional costs of communicating between logical protection
domains.
Using a fast method of upcalls [7], we show how our
sandboxing technique for implementing logical protection
domains provides significant performance improvements
over traditional methods of invoking user-level services. We
believe our approach is a promising method for the safe and
efficient implementation of user-space application and sys-
tem service extensions. It is appropriate for COTS systems,
requiring minimal changes to the kernel.
Experimental results show that using our approach to in-
terpose [23, 17] code between an application and the un-
derlying system results in lower impact on application per-
formance than traditional methods. Likewise, our tech-
nique for implementing (and communicating between) log-
ical protection domains in a single address space has sim-
ilar performance to hardware-based solutions, such as the
“small spaces” work on the Pentium [34]. Finally, we com-
pare various techniques to access sandboxed service exten-
sions. On a Pentium 4 processor, we can safely switch from
the kernel to a sandboxed extension function in 11000 cy-
cles, compared to 46000 cycles if we invoke a user-level
extension in a private address space that is not currently ac-
tive.
The following section describes our user-level sandbox
technique in more detail. This is followed by Section 3
that evaluates the performance of our approach on a Linux
x86 platform. Related work is then discussed in Section 4.
Finally, conclusions and future work are described in Sec-
tion 5.
2. User-Level Sandboxing
Overview: The basic idea of user-level sandboxing is to
modify the address space of all processes, or logical pro-
tection domains, to contain one or more shared pages of
virtual addresses. The virtual address range shared by all
processes provides a sandboxed memory region into which
extensions may be mapped. Under normal operation, these
shared pages will be accessible only by the kernel. How-
ever, when the kernel wishes to pass control to an exten-
sion, it changes the privilege level of the shared page (or
pages) containing the extension code and data, so that it can
be executed with user-level capabilities. This prevents the
extension code from violating the integrity of the kernel.
However, the extension code itself can run in the context of
any user-space process, even one that did not register the
extension with the system. There is potential for malicious
extension code to modify the memory area of a running pro-
cess or extract sensitive data values. To guard against this,
we require extension code registered with the system to ei-
ther: (1) be written in a type-safe language that enforces
memory protection, or (2) be written by a trusted program-
mer. In the latter case, encryption could be used as a means
to authenticate extensions.
While others have argued that type-safe languages [9,
22, 27, 28] incur more costs than hardware-based protec-
tion schemes [6], our approach only relies on language-level
type-safety for extension code mapped to the sandbox re-
gion. All other application and system-level code can be
written in non-type-safe languages. This differs from the
approach of SPIN [2] and JavaOS that require all software
objects to be type-safe. Additionally, type-safe languages
offer the potential for finer granularities of memory protec-
tion than most hardware can accommodate.
2.1. Hardware Support for Memory-Safe
Extensions
Our approach assumes that hardware support is lim-
ited to page-based virtual memory. A series of caches,
most notably one or more untagged translation look-aside
buffers (TLBs) is desirable but not necessary. This mini-
mum hardware requirement is met by most general purpose
processors made today. More specialist hardware meth-
ods of implementing logical protection domains to accom-
modate extension code include the use of processors with
tagged TLBs, or combined segmentation and paging units.
Tagged TLBs provide a fast way to switch between protec-
tion domains mapped to separate address spaces, by stor-
ing the virtual-to-physical address translations of these ad-
dress spaces in non-overlapping regions of a dedicated hard-
ware cache. Alternatively, hardware lacking tagged TLBs
but supporting segmented memory has been used to isolate
these logical protection domains in different memory seg-
ments.
Tagged TLBs have the advantage that they do not need
to be flushed and reloaded when switching between address
spaces (e.g., during a process context switch), unlike un-
tagged TLBs that only cache address translations for an
unspecified virtual memory region. In contrast, processors
such as the Intel x86 have untagged TLBs but employ both
segmentation and paging units. Specifically, the x86 pro-
cessor uses segmentation hardware to convert between log-
ical and linear addresses, and paging hardware to translate
between linear and physical addresses; untagged instruc-
tion and data TLBs are used only to cache linear-to-physical
translations. The advantage with an architecture such as the
x86 is that protection domains can be mapped to separate
memory segments restricted to specific ranges of linear ad-
dresses. Switching between protection domains mapped to
different ranges of linear addresses simply involves switch-
ing the active segment, by changing base and limit values
on addresses, without affecting page table entries cached in
a TLB.
While segmentation hardware can isolate logical protec-
tion domains from one another, it is not supported by many
processors other than the x86 (and, in a similar form, by the
HP PA-RISC). Likewise, tagged TLBs are not common on
the most popular processors for general purpose systems.
This has meant that many general purpose systems imple-
ment course-grained protection domains using only paging
hardware that is fairly universal amongst hardware vendors,
even in the embedded system world 1. To emphasize the
point, x86-based systems such as Linux limit the use of
1e.g., the StrongArm SA1110 processor found in some PDAs employs
page-based virtual memory support.
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Figure 1. (a) Traditional view of logical protection domains, each mapped to a separate address
space. (b) Each process address space has a shared virtual memory region, or sandbox, into which
extensions are mapped. Kernel events, delivered via upcalls to sandbox code, are handled in the
context of the current process, thereby eliminating scheduling costs. Part of the sandbox itself is
switched between kernel and user privilege levels.
segmentation to isolate kernel and user-level protection do-
mains. Process and thread address spaces are defined in
terms of linear addresses within user- or kernel-level seg-
ments. This means that switching between one address
space and another requires a switch between page tables
used for linear address translation.
On many processors, the costs of switching between pro-
tection domains mapped to different pages of virtual (or
linear) addresses, requires switching page tables stored in
main memory, and then reloading TLBs with the necessary
address translations. Such course-grained protection pro-
vided at the hardware-level is becoming more undesirable
as the disparity between processor and memory speeds in-
creases [34]. This is certainly the case for processors that
are now clocking in the gigahertz range, while main mem-
ory is accessed in the 108Hz range. In practice, it is clearly
desirable to keep address translations for separate protec-
tion domains in cache memory as often as possible. User-
level sandboxing avoids the need for expensive page table
switches and TLB reloads by ensuring the sandbox is com-
mon to all address spaces.
2.2. Implementation Details
We have implemented user-level sandboxing on a Linux
x86-based system, with a few small changes to the kernel.
These changes are required to: (1) create a shared sand-
box region, (2) support secure mapping of sandboxed ex-
tensions, (3) allow access to restricted sandboxed memory
regions from conventional process address spaces, and (4)
invoke extension functions from within the kernel. For the
most part, our approach is not restricted to Linux. However,
where necessary, we describe the system-specific features
required for user-level sandboxing to work. The user-level
sandboxing implementation requires a few additional inter-
face functions over those provided by the traditional system
call interface. However, these interface functions are in-
voked via ioctls, avoiding the need for new system calls. As
a result, kernel changes are implemented in a manner simi-
lar to device drivers, and can be included in kernel-loadable
modules, with minimal modification to the core kernel.
Logical Protection Domains for Extension Code: Tra-
ditional operating systems provide logical protection do-
mains for processes mapped into separate address spaces,
as shown in Figure 1(a). With user-level sandboxing (Fig-
ure 1(b)), each process address space is divided into two
parts: a process-private memory region and a shared virtual
memory region. The shared region acts as a sandbox for
mapped extensions. Technically speaking, the sandbox is
further divided into public and protected areas, as explained
later. Kernel events, delivered by upcalls to sandbox code,
are handled in the context of the current process, thereby
eliminating scheduling costs.
Sometimes it is important for a process to exchange data
with extensions registered in the sandbox. As a result, we
allow controlled access to a region of sandbox addresses
by both code in a process-private region and code in the
sandbox itself. An ioctl function, registered with the kernel,
called allocate mapped data(), maps a region of the
sandbox into a process-private address space, as in Fig-
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Figure 2. (a) Sandboxes common to all processes are mapped to the same physical address ranges.
Applications can map pages from their private address space into the sandbox for reading and writing
data. (b) An example sandbox layout for two processes.
ure 1(b). This mapped region is read- and write-accessible
by the calling process and sandbox extensions that can ref-
erence the corresponding range of addresses. This data-
sharing scheme relies on hardware page protection, and so
allocate mapped data() allocates memory on page
boundaries. In our implementation, pages are 4KB in size.
Now, an application process, for which type-safety is not
guaranteed, can arbitrarily rewrite pointers in this mem-
ory shared with the sandbox, circumventing the controls
on memory access by extension code. References to these
mapped regions are consequently passed to extension code
as arrays of character or integer values, making type and
pointer safety in extensions immune to arbitrary writes by
application code.
Sandbox Regions: The sandbox consists of two 4MB re-
gions of virtual memory that are identically mapped in ev-
ery address space to the same physical memory (as shown
in Figure 2(a)). The two regions are backed by physically
contiguous RAM and are adjacent to each other for imple-
mentation convenience. These regions employ the page size
extensions supported by the Pentium processor and each oc-
cupy one 4 megabyte page directory entry 2. The normal
memory management interfaces are not allowed to allocate
memory from these regions as they must be shared by mul-
tiple users.
One sandbox region is permanently assigned read and
execute permission at both user- and kernel-level and acts
as a public area. This region is marked as a global page
using the global flag supported by Pentium Pro and more
recent IA-32 [21] processors. This prevents the page di-
rectory entry for this page from being invalidated when a
context switch occurs. The other region is permanently as-
signed read-write permission at kernel-level but by default
2The 32-bit x86 processor uses a two-level paging scheme, comprising
page directories and tables.
the region is inaccessible at user-level. We refer to this re-
gion as the protected area. The region can be made accessi-
ble to user-level by toggling the user/supervisor flags of its
page directory entry and invalidating the relevant TLB entry
via the INVLPG instruction.
Sandbox/Upcall Threads: A design decision we had to
make was whether or not to allow threads to execute in the
sandbox. If we allowed code in the sandbox to invoke sys-
tem calls, it could be possible for an extension registered by
one process to block the progress of another process. For
example, if process pi registers an extension ei that is in-
voked at the time process pj is active, it may be possible for
ei to affect the progress of pj by issuing ‘slow’ system calls.
One solution is to prevent extensions from issuing system
calls. However, one advantage of user-level extensibility we
wanted to support was the ability to leverage libraries, and
many such library functions make system calls. It would
be overly restrictive to prevent user-level extensions from
issuing system calls. Instead, all system calls issued by an
extension could be made non-blocking. Again, this would
be restrictive and may require extension code to be linked
against special libraries. Moreover, not all system calls can
be made non-blocking.
Finally, we chose to support threads of execution in the
sandbox. At first this seems counter-intuitive, as it requires
threads to have their own stacks and they must be scheduled.
In a system such as Linux, threads are treated almost like
conventional processes when it comes to scheduling. That
is, both have identifiers and task structures for their state in-
formation, but threads merely share their address space with
the parent process. Since sandbox threads execute in any
process context, essentially they are inexpensive to sched-
ule.
A sandbox-bound thread of execution is created by
a user-level process using the create upcall()
interface. create upcall(), like the POSIX
pthread create() produces a new thread of con-
trol sharing the credentials and file descriptor tables of
the caller. The thread produced by create upcall(),
however, does not possess a conventional hardware-based
address space. Instead, sandbox threads execute using the
page tables of the last active address space.
Mapping Code into the Sandbox: The existence of a
shared sandbox requires the modification to the page tables
and address spaces of all created processes (when they are
first ‘forked’). Applications can register handlers and ex-
tensions that are mapped into this sandbox (see Figure 2),
where they may be executed in the context of any process,
since all processes will have page tables that can resolve vir-
tual addresses of instructions and data in this memory area.
The code segment of a sandbox-bound thread is loaded
into the read-only public area of the sandbox, while the
writable data segments are loaded into the protected area.
A modified version of the insmod routine, from the GNU
modutils suite is used to map code into the sandbox. As
both areas are mapped to the same addresses in the page ta-
bles of every process, the sandbox-bound thread always has
access to its code segment. However, before the sandbox-
bound thread may access its data segments at user-space, the
user/supervisor flag for the protected area must be appropri-
ately set at the cost of the necessary TLB invalidate opera-
tion and the subsequent TLB reload. If necessary, this is
done when context switching to the sandbox thread. When
the process whose page tables were used by the sandbox
thread is again scheduled, the user/supervisor flag must be
reset before the process regains control of the CPU at user-
level. This is necessary to keep malicious processes from
gaining access to the protected sandbox area.
Building for the Sandbox: As sandbox-bound threads do
not have conventional address spaces, they are unable to use
certain system interfaces related to memory management
without modification. Some of the the affected interfaces
include brk(), mmap() and shmget(). These inter-
faces are used to fulfill a variety of needs: brk() serves
to allocate and deallocate process-private virtual memory
(for the purposes of dynamic memory allocation), while
shmget() allocates shared memory segments. Likewise,
mmap() can allocate either process-private or shared vir-
tual memory as well as providing memory-mapped file I/O.
We are in the process of modifying these functions as part of
our own version of a trusted libc library, to ensure memory
allocation occurs in the correct address ranges.
Fast Upcalls: Traditionally, signals and other such kernel
event notification schemes [1, 25] have been used to invoke
actions in user-level address spaces when there are specific
kernel state changes. Unfortunately, there are costs asso-
ciated with the traversal of the kernel-user boundary, pro-
cess context-switching and scheduling. The aim is to im-
plement an upcall mechanism with the speed of a software
trap (i.e., the mirror image of a system call), to efficiently
vector events to user-level where they are handled by ser-
vice extensions, in an environment that is isolated from the
core kernel.
Operating systems such as Linux that leverage hardware
protection to separate user- and kernel-address spaces do
not support conventional trap gates to user-level. General
protection faults occur when attempting to trap to a ‘ring
of protection’ that is less critical than the kernel. How-
ever, architectures such as the Intel IA-32 support instruc-
tions such as SYSENTER and SYSEXIT that can be used
in conjunction with Model Specific Registers (MSRs) [21]
to allow fast transitions between kernel and user-level ad-
dress spaces. On the IA-32 architecture, where there are
four rings of protection, we use these instructions to transi-
tion between rings 0 (the kernel privilege level) and 3 (the
user privilege level). While this is not a particularly portable
approach, it is possible to replace these instructions with
‘activation records’ placed on a kernel stack, that trick the
hardware into thinking it is returning to user-level. This ap-
proach is adopted by Palladium [6] and is the typical way
most kernels return control back to user-level after servic-
ing a system call. SYSENTER and SYSEXIT were first
featured in the Pentium II processor. We chose to use these
instructions as they avoid unnecessary memory references
and protection checks, since they require transition between
ring 0 and ring 3.
To avoid the problem of raising kernel events for upcall
handlers (or extensions) when no user-level process is run-
ning, all upcall handlers utilize a private stack in the sand-
box (see Figure 2(b)). Note that it is possible for a kernel
thread, having no user-level context outside the sandbox, to
be executing at the time an upcall is activated. Additionally,
we must schedule the target thread for the execution of up-
call handlers before switching privilege levels. It should be
noted that sandbox extensions cannot be invoked other than
via the trusted kernel.
Potential Protection Problems: When an upcall event is
issued from the kernel, the mechanism will modify an en-
try in the current process’s page table to allow user-level
access to the sandbox only while the upcall event is being
processed. Preemption and signal handling during the ex-
ecution of code in the sandbox must be disabled. Allow-
ing preemption may cause reentrancy problems (e.g., if an-
other process runs and an upcall occurs again), while con-
ventional signal handling can provide a ‘trap door’ into the
sandbox for malicious users. For example, if a signal is
delivered to the current process while executing sandbox
code, the sandbox memory region is open to read-write ac-
cess via the signal handler. Minor changes to the kernel
simply delay delivery of signals until extensions have com-
pleted execution and the sandbox protected area is reset to
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Figure 3. The performance of a thttpd web server while tracing its system calls using a variety of
mechanisms. This shows how interposition code mapped into a user-level sandbox reduces the
impact of system call tracing, compared to traditional methods such as ptrace.
the supervisor privilege level.
3. Experimental Evaluation
A series of experiments were conducted to assess the ef-
fectiveness of a user-level sandboxing implementation in
a modified Linux 2.4.9 kernel running on 1.4 GHz Pen-
tium 4 based systems connected by a Gigabit Ethernet
network. These experiments investigate the relative costs
of implementing interposition agents, the performance of
intra-address space extensions and the effects of TLB work-
ing set sizes on user-level sandboxing.
3.1. Interposition
Interposition agents [23, 17] introduce user code be-
tween the operating system interface and applications, in
order to modify or replace the services that the operating
system provides. The Linux 2.4 kernel series introduced
extensions to ptrace(2) to facilitate system call interception
at user-level. The ptrace mechanism incurs a large overhead
in the form of several context switches per system call. This
significantly reduces the performance of applications under
interposition that make frequent system calls. To show how
the sandbox can reduce interposition overheads, a number
of minimal interposition agents were implemented which
read the system call number of each system call made by an
unmodified thttpd 2.20c web server under a range of HTTP
request loads. The HTTP requests were generated from an-
other host over a Gigabit Ethernet network using httperf.
The same file was targeted in each request, which was made
with a timeout of 1 second. The average rate of successful
responses was recorded over 30000 requests. Three types
of interposition agents were compared:
• A kernel scheduled thread in a traditional process ad-
dress space using ptrace (‘Process traced’)
• A kernel scheduled thread in the sandbox using ptrace
(‘Sandbox thread’)
• An upcall handler based agent executing in the sand-
box (‘Sandbox upcall’)
Figure 3 shows the relative performance of these agents,
compared to the situation where the web server runs un-
traced (‘Untraced Process’). In this experiment, the interpo-
sition code introduces overheads, but we want to investigate
the interposition method that minimizes these overheads.
Running an agent in the sandbox yields consistent improve-
ment in the web server performance over the traditional ad-
dress space based agent. A more significant improvement
is shown by the upcall handler based agent, which is in-
voked from the kernel when a system call is made without
the overhead of having to schedule a thread. Measurements
were also taken for the sandbox based agents where the
sandbox was left open to user space, so that no TLB flushes
were performed when context switching between the web
server and the agent (i.e., the ‘no TLB flush’ cases in Fig-
ure 3). These results show that with the existing ptrace
interface, the sandbox can be used to reduce interposition
overheads, and that with the appropriate interface additional
gains can be made.
3.2. Inter-Protection Domain Communication
To investigate the effects of working set size on the ef-
fectiveness of sandbox-based extensions, a number of IPC
ping-pong experiments similar to those conducted in the
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“small spaces” work [34] were carried out. These experi-
ments also consider the effects of both instruction and data
TLBs, found on the x86 architecture. The Pentium 4 pro-
cessor has a 64 entry data TLB and an 128 entry instruction
TLB for address translation.
Two threads exchange four byte messages over con-
nected pipes. One thread simulates an application thread in
a traditional address space with a configurable instruction
and data TLB working set. The second thread acts as an
extension running either in a separate full address space or
in the sandbox. The ”application” thread fills some number
of TLB entries, sends a message to the ”extension” thread,
and reads a reply message. The application thread then
accesses its previously referenced pages. The extension
thread, which has a small fixed TLB size, is executed either
in the sandbox or in a traditional address space. To simulate
various data TLB sizes, the application thread reads 4 bytes
of data from a series of memory addresses spaced 4160 byte
apart. To simulate instruction TLB sizes, the application
thread performs a series of relative jumps to instructions
spaced 4160 bytes apart. These spacings were chosen to
avoid cache interference effects. The TLB miss counts were
obtained using the Pentium 4 CPU performance counters.
Figure 4(a) shows the data TLB working set of the appli-
cation thread is maintained for up to approximately 45 en-
tries when the extension thread is mapped into the sandbox.
At this point the combined data TLB demands of the oper-
ating system, the application and the extension no longer fit
the 64 entries available on the Pentium 4 and each page ac-
cess incurs a TLB miss. Note that for the extension thread in
a traditional address space, every data page access after the
IPC ping-pong incurs a TLB miss regardless of the work-
ing set size, as all TLB entries have been purged. That is,
the untagged TLBs of the x86 are flushed and reloaded for
every context switch between different address spaces.
The instruction TLB entries of the application thread are
also preserved when the extension is located in the sandbox,
as shown in Figure 4(b). No instruction TLB misses occur
until the working set approaches 110 entries, which is close
to the available 128 TLB entries. Thereafter, the number of
instruction TLB misses are close for both extension types,
with the sandbox extension finally causing slightly more
TLB misses. These results are similar to those in the “small
spaces” work that uses the segmentation features of the x86
to implement multiple logical protection domains within a
single address space. This shows that our user-level sand-
box technique can achieve inter-protection domain commu-
nication performance similar to approaches based on spe-
cialist hardware features such as segmentation.
Additionally, Figure 5(a) shows the communication la-
tency remains lower with the sandbox extension even when
the data TLB miss rates are similar. Likewise, in Fig-
ure 5(b), the pipe latency is considerably lower for the sand-
boxed extension, until the instruction TLB is filled. Once
the working set is no longer able to fit in the available in-
struction TLB entries, the resulting latency for the sandbox
extension is still slightly lower than the traditional address
space extension.
3.3. Web Server Performance Using Dynamic Con-
tent Requests
Further experiments were carried out to evaluate the per-
formance of applications composed of traditional address
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Figure 5. Latency of communication via a pipe between two protection domains, as a function of
working set sizes in terms of (a) data, and (b) instruction pages.
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Figure 6. Performance of an unmodified Apache 2.0.44 web server handling dynamic content requests
with the help of FastCGI processes mapped to both separate address spaces (‘User’ case) and
sandboxed memory regions (‘Sandbox’ case).
space processes extended with sandbox-based code. An un-
modified Apache 2.0.44 web server was configured to sup-
port FastCGI, an interface between web servers and external
processes that generate dynamic content. Apache was con-
figured to communicate over a local UNIX domain socket
with a multi-threaded FastCGI process to satisfy HTTP re-
quests coming from another host. On each request the
FastCGI process reads a 36 Kilobyte XML file from the
filesystem, transforming it into a 20 Kilobyte HTML re-
sponse. Each request is generated by httperf with a 5 second
timeout. Figure 6 shows the performance of application,
when FastCGI threads are running in a separate address
space from the Apache server process (the ‘User’ case), and
when FastCGI threads are executing within the sandbox (the
‘Sandbox’ case). As can be seen, the maximum response
rate is improved when FastCGI threads are mapped to the
sandbox. Similarly, the average request connection time re-
mains lower for a larger request rate when FastCGI threads
execute in the sandbox.
In a similar experiment, dynamic content was provided
by Java Servlets running within an Apache Tomcat 4.1
servlet container. Here, the web server was configured to
use multiple threads running either in the sandbox or in a
traditional address space, communicating with the servlet
container process over TCP sockets. The performance of
the web server-servlet engine was measured while running
the web server in the sandbox as well as in a traditional
address space. In contrast to the FastCGI experiments, the
Java servlet experiment shows reduced performance for a
sandbox-based Apache server, with slightly higher connec-
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Figure 7. Performance of an Apache 2.0.44 web server handling dynamic content requests with the
help of Java servlets. The ‘User’ case shows Apache mapped into a conventional user-level process
address space, while the ‘Sandbox’ case shows Apache mapped into the sandbox.
Operation Cost in CPU Cycles
Upcall including TLB flush/reload 11000
TLB flush and reload 8500
Raw upcall 2500
Signal delivery (current process) 6000
Signal delivery (different process) 46000
Table 1. Microbenchmarks taken on a 1.4GHz Pentium 4, 512 Megs RAM. Cycles given above are
based on the time stamp counter.
tion times at almost all request loads. This is shown in
Figure 7. We attribute the differences in these results to
the larger instruction TLB working set size of the Apache
HTTP server, compared to the FastCGI extensions.
In summary, these experiments show that when the
working sets of logical protection domains do not exceed
the TLB limits, fast inter-protection domain communication
is possible with our user-level sandboxing method. This is
possible without the need for special hardware support, such
as segmentation.
3.4. Microbenchmarks
Table 1 presents a number of microbenchmarks that
point to the effectiveness of using our fast upcalls method,
for invoking sandbox code. We compare our approach to
conventional signals. The complete upcall cost includes the
CPU cycles required to go from kernel space to a user-space
upcall handler function. This includes the costs of flush-
ing the sandbox data area TLB entry, placing arguments
on the upcall stack, performing a SYSEXIT and execut-
ing the user-level prologue of the upcall handler function.
The TLB flush and reload time dominates the overall upcall
cost, while the SYSEXIT instruction cost, referred to as the
raw upcall cost, accounts for less than a third of the elapsed
cycles. The signal costs measure the overheads of deliver-
ing a signal to user space from the kernel within the same
address space context as well as between different address
spaces. The costs of delivering a signal within the same
address space is much lower than the cost of an upcall, as
no hardware protection overheads are involved, but once an
address space switch and scheduling operation are involved
the costs of delivering a signal from kernel to a user-space
process are over 4 times the cost of a full upcall. Note that
the measured cost of delivering a signal to a different pro-
cess involves making that process the highest priority, so it
is guaranteed to be scheduled next.
4. Related Work
There have been a number of related research efforts that
focus on OS structure and extensibility, safety, and service
invocation. Extensible operating systems research [32] aims
at providing applications with greater control over the man-
agement of their resources. In contrast, microkernels such
as Mach [13] offer a few basic abstractions, while moving
the implementation of more complex services and policies
into application-level components. By separating kernel-
and user-level services, microkernels introduce significant
amounts of interprocess communication overhead. This has
caused microkernels to fall out of favor despite substantial
reductions [26] in communication costs.
Other OS approaches, such as the Exokernel [12], try
to efficiently multiplex hardware resources among applica-
tions that utilize library operating systems. Applications are
built by linking with untrusted code that implements tradi-
tional operating system abstractions at user-level using low-
level primitives. Resource management is thus delegated
to library operating systems, which can be readily modi-
fied to suit the needs of individual applications, resulting
in good extensibility. One technique applied in Exokernels
is downloading code in the form of ‘Application Specific
Safe Handlers’ [35] that perform low latency, application-
specific processing of network messages, thereby avoiding
the overhead of application scheduling and dispatching. In
common with the Exokernel approach, user-level sandbox-
ing enables services and extensions to be linked into process
address spaces, along with library code they may use. The
difference is, our approach is aimed at extending existing
systems, by slight modifications to the kernel, as opposed
to employing an entirely new (albeit small) trusted kernel.
In contrast, SPIN [2] is an extensible operating system
that supports extensions written in the Modula-3 program-
ming language. This language provides type-safety and
memory protection, by enforcing interface contracts be-
tween code modules. Extensions signed by the trusted sys-
tem compiler are deemed safe and may be loaded into the
kernel address space at runtime. Interaction between the
core kernel and SPIN extensions is mediated by an event
system, which dispatches events to handler functions in the
kernel, without the overhead of kernel/application boundary
crossing. By providing handlers for events, extensions can
implement application-specific resource management poli-
cies with low overhead. Similar to SPIN, our approach re-
quires extensions are written in a type-safe language if they
are not written by a trusted source. The difference is that
our extensions execute with user-level privileges, and may
run on slightly modified COTS systems.
A transaction-based approach to system extensibility is
employed by the VINO [11] operating system. VINO sup-
ports system extensions known as grafts that are written in
C++. Since C++ is not type-safe and memory protection is
an issue, grafts are run in the context of transactions, so that
the system can be returned to a consistent state if a graft is
aborted. As with all the above approaches, our work differs
in that it is aimed at providing user-level extension support
without the need for a special-purpose OS.
Other extensible systems research includes the DEIMOS
system [8], SLIC [16], Palladium [6] and approaches that
leverage interposition [23, 17]. DEIMOS is novel in that it
does not define a kernel in the strict sense. Instead, it uses
a configuration manager to encapsulate, load and configure
(on demand) traditional kernel functions and application-
specific services in the form of modules. SLIC is interest-
ing in that it leverages interposition to support extensibility
of commodity operating systems. This has a lot in com-
mon with our user-level sandboxing approach. In SLIC, a
series of dispatchers are responsible for intercepting sys-
tem events on a particular interface, and for routing those
events to appropriate extensions that may reside in kernel
or user-space. However, user-level extensions are encapsu-
lated in separate process address spaces that incur expensive
scheduling and context-switching costs when invoked by
dispatchers. In contrast, user-level sandboxing allows ex-
tensions to co-exist at user-level in a shared address space,
avoiding expensive context-switch overheads. Finally, Pal-
ladium leverages both segmentation and multiple rings of
protection to support both user- and kernel-level extensions.
Interestingly, Palladium reorganizes application and exten-
sion code so that extensions are always located in a less
privileged ring of protection than the code that invokes their
services. However, this method is primarily targeted at x86-
based systems and relies on hardware support for protec-
tion. User-level sandboxing does not require segmentation
and multiple rings of protection.
Another area of research related to ours has focused on
service invocation, kernel event notifications [1, 25] and up-
calls [7, 19]. Much of this work is concerned with the way
to trigger user-level services or handlers due to some condi-
tion or event in the kernel. The ‘Kqueue’ work [25] found
in FreeBSD is similar in concept to the kernel event notifi-
cation work of Banga et al [1]. Both pieces of work provide
an efficient means of delivering events to user-space, that
are typically triggered by I/O state changes and traditionally
handled by heavyweight constructs such as poll() and
select(). However, Kqueues provide a general frame-
work that not only supports event notifications relating to
I/O (via socket and file descriptors), but also events tradi-
tionally associated with signals. While both mechanisms
alleviate the costs associated with traditional methods of
event delivery, they do not offer upcalls mechanisms akin to
the mirror image of a system call. Our approach, to use con-
structs such as SYSENTER and SYSEXIT on the Pentium
processor, is similar to the way Palladium [6] allows user-
and kernel-level extensions to be activated from a more
privileged ‘ring of protection’. While SYSENTER and SY-
SEXIT provide a fast way to switch between ring 0 and 3
on the Pentium, there is no reason why our user-level sand-
boxing technique cannot leverage Palladium’s more general
‘activation record’ method. Palladium requires modifica-
tion of the kernel stack of the target process address space,
to spoof the hardware into believing it is returning to a less
privileged protection domain to execute extension code. We
plan on leveraging this approach for hardware platforms
that support multiple rings of protection but lack the con-
venient SYSENTER and SYSEXIT instructions.
Finally, observe that our work is not to be confused with
user-level resource-constrained sandboxing [5], by Chang,
Itzkovitz and Karamcheti. Their work focuses on the use
of sandboxes to enforce quantitative restrictions on resource
usage. They propose a method for instrumenting an applica-
tion, to intercept requests for resources such as CPU cycles,
memory and bandwidth. As a result, they are able to con-
trol the allocation of such resources in a predictable manner.
The emphasis of our work is to develop fine-grained protec-
tion domains at user-level for the execution of extensions,
regardless of which address space is active at the time ex-
tension code is invoked.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
Extensible systems allow services to be configured and
deployed for the specific needs of individual applications.
While extensibility is desirable it poses at least three con-
flicting challenges: (1) how to guarantee efficient execution
of the extension code that modifies or adds functionality to
the system, (2) how to ensure the safety of extensions that
could otherwise violate the integrity of the system, or appli-
cations themselves, and (3) how to provide support for ex-
tensibility without significant modification to the standard
interfaces offered by the system.
This paper describes a safe and efficient method for user-
level extensibility that requires only minimal changes to the
kernel. We describe a sandboxing technique that supports
multiple logical protection domains within the same address
space at user-level. This approach allows applications to
register sandboxed code with the system, that may be exe-
cuted in the context of any process. Our approach differs
from other implementations that require special hardware
support, such as segmentation or tagged TLBs, to either
implement multiple protection domains in a single address
space, or to support fast switching between address spaces.
Likewise, we do not require the entire system to be written
in a type -safe language, to provide fine-grained protection
domains. Instead, our user-level sandboxing technique re-
quires only paged-based virtual memory support, and the
requirement that extension code is written either in a type-
safe language, or by a trusted source.
Experimental results show that using our approach to in-
terpose [23, 17] code between an application and the un-
derlying system results in lower impact on application per-
formance than traditional methods. Likewise, our tech-
nique for implementing (and communicating between) log-
ical protection domains in a single address space has sim-
ilar performance to hardware-based solutions, such as the
“small spaces” work on the Pentium [34]. This supports our
argument that user-level sandboxing can be implemented
efficiently, as a way to support extensibility (assuming hard-
ware restrictions on the working set sizes of logical protec-
tion domains).
Also by experiment, we compare various techniques to
access sandboxed service extensions. On a Pentium 4 pro-
cessor, we can safely switch from the kernel to a sandboxed
extension function in 11000 cycles, compared to 46000 cy-
cles if we invoke a user-level extension in a private address
space that is not currently active. While our approach uses
SYSEXIT and SYSENTER machine instructions to quickly
switch from the kernel protection domain to user-level, a
more portable approach is possible, by establishing an “ac-
tivation record” on the kernel stack of a running process and
then returning to user-level. As a result, we see no reason
why our user-level sandboxing technique cannot easily be
ported to a number of COTS systems with only minimal
kernel modifications.
Future work involves a thorough study of the costs of
type-safe languages and cryptographic methods for enforc-
ing trust on sandboxed extension code. Many have ar-
gued that hardware methods such as segmentation avoid
such costs, but hardware support for fine-grained protec-
tion domains (less than a page in size) is not common on
many processors. Additionally, we are considering the im-
plementation of sandboxed virtual machines and extensible
services for use in a distributed system for processing sen-
sor streams. The idea is to enable low-overhead end-host
processing of networked data.
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